This paper studies the relationship between inflation, output, money and interest rates in the euro area, using data spanning 1980-2000. The P model is shown to have considerable empirical support. Thus, the "price gap" or, equivalently, the "real money gap" (the gap between current real balances and long-run equilibrium real balances), has substantial predictive power for future inflation. The real money gap contains more information about future inflation than the output gap and the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator (the gap between current M3 growth and a reference value). The results suggest that the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator is an inferior indicator of future inflation. JEL Classification Numbers: E42, E52, E58
Introduction
This paper studies data spanning 1980-2000 on prices, output, money and interest rates in the countries constituting the euro area, and focuses on the question of what role the ECB should attach to broad money in its conduct of policy. It is motivated by two observations. First, the Eurosystem has adopted a monetary policy framework which emphasizes the role of monetary aggregates (see ECB [14] ). While it has made clear that monetary targeting would not be appropriate under current conditions (Issing [21] ), the Eurosystem's announcements suggest that broad money growth is a major information variable used when setting policy. Second, it is sometimes claimed that the Bundesbank's and the Swiss National Bank's (SNB's) outstanding record of in ‡ation control stemmed from their use of monetary targeting. However, a number of scholars of German monetary policy have argued that the Bundesbank's "pragmatic" monetary targeting was best viewed as monetary targeting in words only, but in ‡ation targeting in deeds. 1 Similarly, many observers have interpreted the SNB's policy decisions as suggesting that the deviation of the monetary base from target was by no means the sole factor in ‡uencing policy. 2 Furthermore, in December 1999, the SNB [40] o¢cially abandoned monetary targeting, announced a de…nition of price stability similar to the Eurosystem's, and declared that " [m] onetary policy decisions will be based mainly on an in ‡ation forecast, which will take all relevant indicators into account."
The Eurosystem has announced that it relies heavily on two "pillars" in determining the appropriate level of interest rates. The …rst of these is a money-growth indicator, de…ned as the deviation of M3 growth from a reference value, which under normal circumstances is supposed to signal "risks to price stability" (ECB [14] ). The second pillar is an in ‡ation forecast, referred to as a "broadly-based assessment of the outlook for future price developments." The prominence given to the money-growth indicator has been criticized, for instance by Svensson [35] , on the grounds that it may be a poor predictor of the future path of prices and that instead the second pillar, the in ‡ation forecast, is likely to be considerable more useful in assessing risks to price stability.
Against this background, the paper examines the role of monetary aggregates as indicators of future in ‡ation when gearing policy to maintaining price stability. We are particularly concerned 1 by the question of what forms of monetary indicators are useful, if money does indeed play an important role in in ‡uencing in ‡ation a year or two ahead. For instance, does the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator provide information about the future course of in ‡ation? If so, is it more informative than a "price gap" or a "real money gap"? 3 We also investigate whether monetary indicators dominate output gaps as information variables for future in ‡ation.
We note from the outset that an unavoidable problem in studying monetary relationships in the euro area is the fact that there is little data from the period after the introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999. One possible reaction to this is to conclude that empirical work had better wait until more data is available. Alternatively, one can construct measures of aggregate money, prices, output and interest rates in the countries forming the euro area for the period before the introduction of the euro, and use these to study the information content of money. 4 Of course, in doing so one must hope that the dynamic relationships between the data will remain broadly stable even after the introduction of the euro, in de…ance of the Lucas critique. In this paper we take this second route, fully recognizing the problems that are implicit in the strategy. 5 To preview our results, we …nd that the so-called P ¤ model has substantial empirical support.
Thus, the "price gap", or equivalently and in our view preferably, 6 the "real money gap" (de…ned as the gap between current real money balances and long-run equilibrium real money balances)
contains considerable information about the future path of in ‡ation. Furthermore, and perhaps surprisingly, the real money gap has more predictive power than the output gap. These results suggest that the real money gap should be an important information variable for the Eurosystem.
Furthermore, we …nd that while the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator (the gap between current M3 growth and the Eurosystem's reference value) does have some predictive power for future in ‡ation, this information is already embedded in the real money gap. 7 Thus, the money-growth indicator has no marginal predictive power in the presence of the real money gap.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in ‡ation, output, money and interest 3 The role of indicators in monetary policy is discussed in a classic papers by Kareken, Muench and Wallace [23] and Friedman [15] . A recent more general discussion is in Svensson [36, section 3.3] . Svensson and Woodford [39] provide a rigorous analysis of the role of indicators for optimal policy in a model with partial information and forward-looking variables. 4 Wesche [46] takes this approach and estimates P ¤ -models on aggregated data for various European groupings of countries. 5 A third route is to use U.S. data, on the ground that the Euro area will be a closed economy of similar size as the U.S., and that therefore results about U.S. relations between in ‡ation, interest rates, output and money should be of some relevance for the Euro area. This route is followed in Rudebusch and Svensson [33] . 6 In our view, the concept "real money gap" is preferable because it (1) refers directly to monetary aggregates (which is advantageous in a discussion of the predictive power of monetary aggregates), (2) is consistent with the insight that demand for money is demand for real money, (3) gives a precise meaning to the (somewhat imprecise) notion of "monetary overhang," and (4) lends itself to comparision with the output gap. 7 The issue of the existence of a direct real-money e¤ect on output, argued by Meltzer [25] and Nelson [26] , is not examined in this paper.
2 rates in theory. Section 3 examines the corresponding empirical relations between these variables in euro-area data, including the empirical properties of monetary indicators, especially the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator. Section 4 presents some conclusions.
In ‡ation and money in theory
In this section we set out a minimum model of the determination of prices. The model emphasizes the role of monetary factors in the in ‡ation process and consists of an in ‡ation equation and a money-demand equation. In what follows, all variables (except interest rates and time) are in natural logarithms. Logs and interest rates are scaled by one hundred; hence they are measured in percent. Time should be thought of as being measured in quarters.
In ‡ation determination
The starting point for our analysis is a Phillips curve of the form
where
) is the annualized in ‡ation rate in quarter t, p t is the price level, ¼ e t+1;t is expectations in quarter t of in ‡ation in quarter t + 1 (which we specify further below), y t is output, y ¤ t is potential output, y t ¡y ¤ t is the output gap, z t is any exogenous variable or shift factor (for instance, a supply shock) (we discuss the dating of the exogenous variable further below), and " t an iid "cost-push" shock, and where ® y > 0.
In P ¤ models (see Hallman, Porter and Small [19] and Tödter and Reimers [42] ), in ‡ation is instead assumed to be governed by
where ® p > 0. Thus, the P ¤ model replaces the output gap with the negative of the "price gap,"
as the key determinant of in ‡ation. 8 Here p ¤ t , the long-run equilibrium (LRE) price level, denotes the price level that would result with the current money stock, provided output is at potential and velocity at its long-run equilibrium level. Thus, p ¤ t is de…ned as
where m t is the money stock (in empirical work typically M2 or M3), v t´pt +y t ¡m t is velocity, and v ¤ t is the LRE velocity, which we specify further below. 8 Some of the literature has de…ned the price gap with the opposite sign, as p
While the microfoundations of the P ¤ model are not clear (to us, at least), the model has been used to account for the behavior of prices in a number of countries, and is typically seen among proponents for monetary targeting as providing a theoretical rationale for focusing policy deliberations on the behavior of monetary aggregates. 9 For these reasons, we use the P ¤ set-up here. 10 Since we focus on the role of monetary aggregates, it is instructive to follow Svensson [37] and express the P ¤ model in terms of the real money gap,m t ¡m ¤ t , wherem t´mt ¡ p t is real money balances andm
is LRE real money balances. Since the real money gap is the negative of the price gap,
we can then write the P ¤ model as
where ® m´®p > 0. The P ¤ model consequently assigns a crucial role to the real money gap as a predictor of future in ‡ation, analogous to the role of the output gap in traditional Phillips curves. One immediate consequence of this is that, to the extent the P ¤ model accounts for the behavior of in ‡ation, the real money gap, rather than nominal money growth, is the natural indicator of future in ‡ation. We show in the empirical part of the paper that this is the case in the euro-area data we consider.
In ‡ation expectations
To make the in ‡ation equation operational, we need to specify how expectations are formed. For a forward-looking Phillips curve, the rational expectations hypothesis is typically invoked. 11 For 9 The P ¤ model is used to discuss Bundesbank monetary targeting in Jahnke and Reimers [22] , Neumann [27] , Tödter and Reimers [42] , Tödter and Ziebarth [43] and von Hagen [45] . This may give the impression that the P ¤ model provides some rationale for money-growth targeting, especially since the P ¤ model seems to be part of the Bundesbank's view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, see Jahnke and Reimers [22] . Svensson [37] shows that, although the P ¤ model gives a prominent role to monetary aggregates, in particular the "real money gap," it does not provide a rationale for money-growth targeting.
Hallman, Porter and Small [19] and Christiano [6] discuss the performance of the P ¤ model for the U.S. 1 0 See Meltzer [25] , Nelson [26] , Rudebusch and Svensson [33] , Svensson [34] and Woodford [47] for recent discussions of the role of money in monetary policy and the transmission mechanism.
1 1 See Roberts [30] for discussion of alternative Phillips curves. Bernanke and Woodford [3] , Clarida, Gali and Gertler [8] and Svensson and Woodford [38] discuss forward-looking Phillips curves with in ‡ation predetermined by one period and given by ¼t+1 = ±Et¼t+2 + ®yEt(yt+1 ¡ y ¤ t+1 ) + "t+1; where ± (0 < ± · 1) is a discount factor. a simple backward-looking Phillips curve, in ‡ation expectations, ¼ e t+1;t , are normally modelled as being adaptive and given by current and lagged in ‡ation. 12 In addition to past in ‡ation rates, monetary policy makers' views regarding the acceptable or desirable rate of in ‡ation play an important role in the in ‡ation process by in ‡uencing in ‡ation expectations. To model this relationship, we let the expected rate of in ‡ation also depend on the euro-area central banks' average implicit "in ‡ation objective,"1 t , which we specify further below. This objective, which may be time varying, can be interpreted as the in ‡ation rate policy makers would …nd appropriate in the near future, but it need not necessarily be interpreted as a formal target. In our econometric work, we model expectations as deviating from the objective according to
where 0 · ® ¼ · 1. In this formulation, we may interpret 1 ¡ ® ¼ as an index of credibility of the in ‡ation objective. The closer to unity this index is, the more credible is the in ‡ation objective, in the sense of in ‡ation expectations being more in ‡uenced by the objective and less in ‡uenced by deviations of in ‡ation from the objective.
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the behavior of in ‡ation in LRE, which we de…ne as a situation in whichm t´m ¤ t , z t+1´0 , " t+1´0 and ¼ e t+1;t =1 t+1 . From (2.6) and (2.7) we then have that
Thus, the LRE rate of in ‡ation is given by the central banks' in ‡ation objective.
The demand for real money balances
To operationalize the concept of the real money gap, we must specify the demand for the real money stock. Following the large econometric literature on the demand for money, we assume the following simple, but reasonably ‡exible and realistic error-correction speci…cation,
the spread between the long and the short interest rate, i l t ¡ i t , as measuring the opportunity cost of holding money. This is consistent with the short interest rate being a proxy for the own return on money, and long bond yields capturing the return on the main non-monetary asset. 13 With the dating of variables in (2.9) and the assumption that in ‡ation is predetermined one quarter, it follows that money demand is also predetermined by one quarter. 14 Several aspects of this demand function are notable. First, the inclusion of the term ¡· ¼ ¼ t+1 on the right side of (2.9) allows the adjustment to a long-run equilibrium to be in terms of the change in the real money stock (· ¼ = 0) or the nominal money stock (· ¼ = 1), or intermediate cases between the two (0 < · ¼ < 1). Thus, the equation does not impose instantaneous homogeneity of money demand with respect to prices. Second, the term inside the bracket can be interpreted as a long-run money demand equal tõ
where we assume that real money balances are normalized so that there is no constant in (2.10).
Third, we de…ne a long-run equilibrium (LRE) as a situation when output equals potential output (y t = y ¤ t ), in ‡ation equals the in ‡ation objective (¼ t+1 =1 t+1 , which requires the inclusion of · ¼1t+1 on the right side of (2.9) to eliminate the e¤ect of ¼ t+1 in LRE), and the interest rate spread equals its LRE value. On the basis of graph 2 below, we assume that the interest rate spread is stationary and that the LRE spread is constant. Thus, the LRE real money balances
where · ¤ is a constant, equal to the negative of · i times the LRE spread. 15 1 3 In most economies, time deposits constitute a large part of M3 and act as a bu¤er stock when funds are shifted in to, and out of, M3. Since time deposits are typically remunerated at rates close to interbank rates, short rates are a good proxy for the own return on broad monetary aggregates. 1 4 See Browne, Fagan and Henry [4] for a survey of European money-demand equations. A similar moneydemand equation for M2, although with the short interest rate being the opportunity cost of holding money and without the in ‡ation term on the right hand side, is estimated on U.S. data and used to discuss monetary targeting in Rudebusch and Svensson [33] . 1 5 This is consistent with de…ning the short and long LRE nominal interest rates, i l¤ +1t+1, where r ¤ and r l¤ are constant short and long LRE real interest rates, and both short-and long-run in ‡ation expectations equal the current in ‡ation objective. Then,
Furthermore, in a LRE, it follows that ¢m
Assuming that ¢y ¤ t , the trend growth of potential output, is constant and equal to ¢y ¤ , substituting this and ¼t+1 =1t+1 into (2.9), it follows that the parameter ·0 is constant and ful…lls ·0 = (1 ¡ ·1)·y¢y ¤ :
6 It follows that LRE velocity, v ¤ t´y ¤ t ¡m ¤ t , referred to in (2.3) and (2.4), is given by
In ‡ation and money in euro-area data
Having reviewed out model, we next discuss the data, our estimation strategy and the results.
The data
As noted above, since the euro was launched at the beginning of 1999, there is little data available. In order to carry out the empirical analysis, we therefore use aggregate data for the euro area before the introduction of the euro. The data on output, money and short and long interest rates are somewhat revised data from Coenen and Vega [10] . They were also updated using the ECB's Monthly Bulletin. Moreover, we construct measures of euro-wide consumer prices and of the energy component in the consumer price index, and a measure of the output gap. 16 Potential output is computed by subtracting the output gap from output. While the data set starts in 1980:1 and ends in 2000:2, estimation starts typically in 1981:4 to compute growth rates and to allow for su¢cient lags in the regression equations.
To explore the relationship between the variables, graph 1 plots in ‡ation and nominal money growth measured over four quarters, ¢ 4 p t and ¢ 4 m t . 17 The graph shows that the in ‡ation rate fell sharply from about 11% per annum in the early 1980s to about 2% in 1986, then rose to about 5% in early 1992, after which it gradually declined and fell to .8% in the end of 1998 before rising above 2% in 2000. Moreover, the rate of money growth fell from 12% in late 1982 to 3.6% in 1997, before accelerating to almost 6% in the beginning of 2000. While there is a gradual decline in both variables over the sample period, the bivariate relationship between the two variables does not appear very tight. 18 Of course, this is not necessarily surprising, since the graph disregards changes in real money growth, which would tend to obscure the relationship 1 6 After 1995:1, the o¢cial HICP and the energy component thereof are used. For the earlier period we constructed euro-wide consumer and energy price indices by weighting the growth rates of national price indices, using as weights nominal GDP expressed in common currency. Annual output-gap data were taken from the OECD, and were interpolated to obtain quarterly data points. In addition, oil prices were converted into euro (for use as instruments for the Hausman test) using a synthetic exchange rate. 1 7 We let ¢4xt´xt ¡ xt¡4 for any variable x. 1 8 ECB [13, Chart 4] presents a variant of graph 1 which gives the impression of a somewhat tighter correlation between money growth and in ‡ation. In that variant, money growth is leaded by 6 quarters and 4-quarter money growth and in ‡ation is smoothed by 8-quarter moving averages. To our knowledge, this is the only empirical evidence the Eurosystem has provided to date in favor of its money-growth indicator.
7 between money growth and in ‡ation. 19 In graph 2 we show the behavior of the short and long interest rates; these also fall gradually over time. All-in-all, all the nominal variables illustrate the gradual disin ‡ation achieved in the euro area.
To get a clearer view of the role of money in the in ‡ation process, we next turn to the estimation of the empirical model. 
Graph 4 Inflation objective and Bundesbank inflation target
(%/yr) 1 9 Note that, as discussed in Rudebusch and Svensson [33] , the relation between in ‡ation and nominal money growth can be illuminated by the identity
where ¢4mt is 4-quarter real money growth. With an empirical money-demand equation like (2.9), real money growth will not be stable. This will reduce the correlation between in ‡ation and nominal money-growth. 
In ‡ation and the in ‡ation objective
As a preliminary step, it is useful to consider the behavior of in ‡ation. There is little doubt that the decline of in ‡ation has largely been due to the growing commitment on the part of monetary policy makers in the euro area to achieve and maintain low in ‡ation. The gradual decline in in ‡ation can therefore be interpreted as corresponding to a fall in the average (implicit) in ‡ation objective,1 t , of the central banks in the euro area.
Since, as assumed in (2.7), the implicit in ‡ation objective in ‡uences in ‡ation by a¤ecting in ‡ation expectations, we need to model the evolution over time of the in ‡ation objective. This is not a trivial exercise. To do so, we start from the observation that a main purpose of the European Monetary System, which was founded in 1979, was to facilitate for its members to reduce their in ‡ation rates to levels similar to that in Germany. While the Bundesbank never adopted a formal in ‡ation target, an implicit in ‡ation target (referred to as "unavoidable in ‡ation", a "price norm" or a "medium-term price assumption" -played an integral part in the computation of its monetary target. Below we refer to this for simplicity as Bundesbank's in ‡ation target. Moreover, we assume that the long-run in ‡ation objective of the central banks in the euro area was to reduce in ‡ation to the level given by the Bundesbank's in ‡ation target.
Of course, with the average in ‡ation rate in the euro area about 8 percentage points above the Bundesbank's in ‡ation target in the early 1980s, it was clear that the disin ‡ation had to be gradual. In line with this, we assume that the euro-area in ‡ation objective in quarter t,1 t , equals actual euro-area 4-quarter in ‡ation in 1981:1 and thereafter converges to Bundesbank's in ‡ation target, ¼ b t , according to1
where°(0 ·°· 1) is inversely related to the speed of convergence.
To operationalize (3.1), we need to make an assumption about the size of°. To do so, let T denote the "half-life" of the deviation between the two in ‡ation objectives, that is, the number of quarters it takes to reduce an initial deviation between1 t and ¼ b t to a half. Any assumption regarding T has then an implication for°, since the two are related by to the formula°= :5 1=T . 20 Thus, the problem of selecting°can be given an economic content. In the empirical work reported below, we set T = 12 quarters, which implies that°= :944. Since this assumption of the half-life of deviations is arbitrary, we have examined the sensitivity of our 2 0 We have°T = 0:5, which results in°= 0:5 1=T .
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results to alternative hypothesis about T . Assuming T = 8 or 16 quarters (implying°equal to :917 or .958, respectively) has no material impact on the results. Graph 4 shows the resulting in ‡ation objective and the Bundesbank's in ‡ation target. 21 
Estimating the model
Fitting the model entails estimating the in ‡ation equation, (2.6), the weight the public attaches to the deviation of in ‡ation from the objective in forming expectations of the future rate of in ‡ation, (2.7), the money-demand equation, (2.9) and the LRE money demand, (2.11). We …t the in ‡ation and money-demand equations individually using OLS and also as a system using SURE. Since we use mainly pre-1999 data, but are interested in the determination of in ‡ation in the period after establishment of the euro, we …nd it natural to perform the estimation on data ending in 1998:4, and use the data 1999:1-2000:2 to study the model's out-of-sample performance and to test for structural breaks.
Estimating · y
In order to estimatem ¤ t in (2.11), we need to know the long-run income elasticity of money demand, · y . The long-run income elasticity can be thought of as a cointegration parameter.
To estimate it, we follow the Engle and Granger [11] approach, estimate it separately in a …rst step, then use the resulting estimate in the subsequent regressions. (the constant and the OLS standard error are not reported). 22 We then treat 1:51 as the true value of · y , and calculatem ¤ t accordingly.
The real money gap
Graph 3 displays our estimate of the real money gap,m t ¡m ¤ t , together with the deviation of in ‡ation measured over four quarters from the in ‡ation objective measured over the same 2 1 The source of Bundesbank's implicit in ‡ation target through 1998:4 is Bo…nger [5] , except for 1985 for which we use 2.5% (see von Hagen [45] ). We assume that the in ‡ation target equals 1.5% per year from 1999:1.
2 2 The OLS standard error (which is inconsistent when the variables are nonstationary) is .02. For comparison purposes, we also estimated ·y by performing a Johansen test for cointegration on a system consisting ofmt and y t . After …rst testing for lag length and the importance of a time trend, we estimated a VAR(3) without a time trend on data spanning 1981:2-1998:4. Both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests rejected the hypothesis of no cointegrating vector, but not the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector, at the 5% level. Allowing for one cointegrating relationship, we estimate ·y = 1:51, with a standard error of .03. time horizon, ¢ 4 p t ¡ ¢ 4pt . (Herep t´p0 + P t j=11 t+j =4 denotes the price level associated with the in ‡ation objective, so ¢ 4pt´pt ¡p t¡4´P 3 j=01 t¡j =4 denotes a four-quarter moving average of the in ‡ation objective; recall that1 t is measured in percent per annum.) The graph shows that both variables evolve in much the same way over time. Moreover, and perhaps more interestingly, the real money gap appears to move somewhat before the rate of in ‡ation, suggesting that it may be useful for predicting future in ‡ation.
In ‡ation
We combine (2.6) and (2.7) into the in ‡ation equation to be estimated,
where we have also added four lags of in ‡ation in energy prices, ¢q t+1 among the regressors.
(Hence, they correspond to the exogenous variable z t+1 in (2.6)). The reason for doing so is that energy price movements typically account for a large fraction of the short-term variability of CPI in ‡ation. Since such price movements are largely exogenous and not easily undone by monetary policy measures, we control for their impact by including the current and three lagged values among the regressors. A further reason for including energy prices among the regressors is that not doing so would lead to omitted variables bias. Moreover, and more importantly, it would increase the variance of the residuals and worsen the …t of the equation. This is of particular concern in our case since it is more di¢cult to reject the hypothesis of parameter constancy, and the con…dence bands for out-of-sample forecasts are larger and thus less stringent, in a poorly …tting model. Since the contemporaneous change in energy prices that appear among the regressors is highly signi…cant, it may be argued that the estimates may be subject to simultaneity bias of unknown magnitude. To guard against this possibility, we conduct a Hausman test ( [20] ). Using the current and four lagged levels of oil prices expressed in euros, we obtain a p-value of 0.44. 23 Thus, we do not reject the hypothesis that energy prices are exogenous. 
. Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. */** denotes signi…cance at the 5%/1% level. The constant is not reported.
We also estimate our preferred speci…cation of the in ‡ation equation together with the money demand function (see below), using Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques (SURE). The results in column 2 are very similar to those in column one-although the standard errors are somewhat smaller-and we therefore do not refer to them further. 24 The …nding that the real money gap has substantial predictive power for future in ‡ation in the euro-area data considered is encouraging and raises the question whether it is more 2 3 The R-square in the …rst-step regression is 0.74 and the p-value for a test of the hypothesis that all regressors are zero is .000. The result of nonsigni…cance of the Hausman speci…cation test is not sensitive to the inclusion of the current level of oil prices or the exact lag length. 2 4 The correlation coe¢cient for the error terms in the in ‡ation and money-demand equations is ¡:28.
informative than the output gap and Eurosystem's money-growth indicator, both of which might contain information about the future path of prices. To address this question, we specify the money-growth indicator as ¢ 4 m t ¡ ¢ 4 m ¤ t , the four-quarter growth of nominal M3, ¢ 4 m t , less a reference value for four-quarter money growth, ¢ 4 m ¤ t . The Eurosystem, following Bundesbank, speci…es the reference value as the sum of an in ‡ation target and a forecast of potential output growth, less a forecast of the velocity trend (see ECB [12] and [14] ). Thus, we can interpret
as a reference value for nominal money growth for the next four quarters, involving the fourquarter in ‡ation objective and four-quarter forecast of potential output and LRE velocity. In the regressions below, we de…ne the reference value as
involving the realized (estimated) values of potential output and LRE velocity. Table 1 , column 3, shows an OLS estimate of the in ‡ation equation, (3.2) , where the output gap, y t ¡ y ¤ t , and the money-growth indicator, ¢ 4 m t ¡ ¢ 4 m ¤ t , have been added as explanatory variables. Strikingly, the parameter estimates for the real money gap is una¤ected by the inclusion of the other two variables and remain highly signi…cant. By contrast, the parameters on the output gap and the money-growth indicator are both numerically small and insigni…cant.
Furthermore, the adjusted R-square falls from .71 to .70. Thus, it appears that neither the output gap nor the money-growth indicator contains any marginal information for future in ‡ation beyond that contained in the real money gap, current in ‡ation and energy-price changes.
To further explore the information content of the output gap and the money-growth indicator, columns 4 and 5 of table 1 show regressions using either the output gap or the money-growth indicator as the key forcing variable for in ‡ation. The output gap is then signi…cant at the 1% level and the money-growth indicator at the 5% level. Moreover, the adjusted R-square falls to .64 and .63, respectively. Since both variables are individually signi…cant, we include both of them. The results in column (6) indicate that both are signi…cant.
From the above analysis we conclude that, while the output gap and the money-growth indicator both contain information about the future course of in ‡ation, that information is embodied in the real money gap which thus appears to be a superior information variable for future in ‡ation. This conclusion is supported by table 2, which shows that the correlations between the real money gap, the output gap and the money-growth indicator are sizeable. In particular, the correlation between the real money gap and the money-growth indicator is .72.
Thus, one interpretation of the results in column 5 is that the money-growth is but a proxy for the real money gap (since column 3 indicates that there is no additional information in the money-growth indicator). 25 The results
show that the coe¢cient on the error-correction term, · m , is signi…cant, as is the total coe¢cient, · m · i , on the interest rate spread. Thus, an increase in the long interest rate reduces the demand for money, while an increase in the short interest rate, which we take to measure the own return on money, increases money demand. The coe¢cient on the negative of the deviation between in ‡ation and the in ‡ation objective, · ¼ = :17, is also signi…cant, implying that the adjustment to the long-run money demand is mostly in terms of the change in real rather than nominal money. Overall, the OLS estimate of the money-demand function seems quite good. Moreover, the parameter estimates are virtually una¤ected when the equation is reestimated together with the in ‡ation equation using SURE (see column 2). To more formally assess the stability of the two equations, we also The results indicate that the real money gap Granger-causes in ‡ation deviations. Indeed, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality is consistently rejected for all lags below the 1% signi…cance level. There is also evidence that the output-gap Granger-causes in ‡ation deviations, although not as strong. For some lags (other than 6) the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% signi…cance levels.
Importantly, there is strong indication that the money-growth indicator does not Grangercause in ‡ation deviations. In fact, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality cannot be rejected at conventional signi…cance levels at any lag. This result is fully consistent with the Grangercausality tests in Trecroci and Vega [44] , who also demonstrate that the money-growth indicator does not Granger-cause in ‡ation.
Furthermore, there is strong indication that the real money gap and the output gap Grangercause the money-growth indicator, whereas the reverse is not true. The results from these Granger causality test supports our earlier …nding that the real money gap is a useful indicator of future in ‡ation. While the output gap also is informative about the evolution of in ‡ation, it is less so than the real money gap. Finally, the money-growth indicator does not seem to contain any useful information for future in ‡ation. Overall, we interpret these results as urging caution in employing the money-growth indicator as an information variables for risks to price stability.
Conclusions
This paper provides a preliminary study of the determination of in ‡ation and the role of monetary indicators in the euro area, using reconstructed data for 1998-2000. A main …nding is that the P ¤ model, in which the gap between the current price level and long-run equilibrium price level is the main determinant of future in ‡ation, has substantial empirical support. As in Svensson [37] , given the emphasis on monetary indicators and aggregates, we prefer to express the P ¤ model in terms of the real money gap (the gap between the real money stock and the long-run equilibrium real money stock), which is identical to the negative of the price gap. Thus, we …nd that the real money gap has substantial predictive power for future in ‡ation. It follows that the real money gap should be an important indicator of future in ‡ation for the Eurosystem.
We have also examined the indicator properties for future in ‡ation of the output gap and the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator (the gap between current M3 growth and the Eurosystem's reference value). Surprisingly, the output gap seems to have less predictive power for future in ‡ation than the real money gap. Although the output gap seems to Granger-cause in ‡ation, it does not seem to contain any information not already contained in the real money gap.
Less surprisingly (given earlier theoretical and empirical work), the performance of the Eu-rosystem's money-growth indicator is inferior to that of the other two variables. In bivariate Granger-causality tests, the money-growth indicator does not seem to Granger-cause future in ‡ation. Furthermore, it does not contain any marginal information beyond that already contained in the real money gap and the output gap. To the extent the money-growth indicator contains any information for future in ‡ation, it may be exclusively in its capacity as a proxy for the real money gap and/or the output gap. Thus, we …nd little empirical support for the prominent role the Eurosystem has assigned for its money-growth indicator.
Moreover, as argued theoretically in Svensson [34] , [35] and [37] and demonstrated empirically in Rudebusch and Svensson [33] , but counter to much conventional wisdom, the lack of predictive power of the money-growth indicator does not depend on the existence of stable short-run or long-run money-demand functions. In the present paper, the inferior performance of the money-growth indicator occurs in spite of well-behaved estimated short-run and long-run moneydemand functions.
In interpreting these results, several caveats need to be kept in mind. First, our empirical results may be sensitive to the exact choice of data. The way the synthetic euro-area data has been constructed may matter, and it is possible that other measures of the output gap are more informative about future in ‡ation than the one used here. Second, the real money gap and the money-growth indicator share with the output gap the dependence on estimates of potential output, which are notoriously di¢cult and uncertain. Third, calculations of the real money gap and the money-growth indicator also hinge on the assumed stability of the long-run income elasticity of money demand, which may shift after the introduction of the euro. The P ¤ model breaks down without such stability (see Orphanides and Porter [28] and Rudebusch and
Svensson [33] ). Of course, the introduction of the euro might be associated with a shift in the long-run demand for euro which would make the P ¤ model unreliable, possibly increasing the relative advantage of the output gap as an indicator for future in ‡ation.
Thus, the …rst two caveats above apply in equal measure to all three indicators studied and do not provide any compelling reason to modify the conclusion that the information content in the real money gap is superior to that of the output gap and the money-growth indicator. The third caveat does not apply to the output gap and may hence provide a reason to modify the conclusions in the direction of increased relative indicator performance for the output gap.
